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Abstract
For frequentist settings in which parameter randomness represents variability rather
than uncertainty, the ideal measure of the support for one hypothesis over another is
the difference in the posterior and prior log odds. For situations in which the prior
distribution cannot be accurately estimated, that ideal support may be replaced by
another measure of support, which may be any predictor of the ideal support that,
on a per-observation basis, is asymptotically unbiased. Two qualifying measures of
support are defined. The first is minimax optimal with respect to the population and is
equivalent to a particular Bayes factor. The second is worst-sample minimax optimal
and is equivalent to the normalized maximum likelihood. It has been extended by
likelihood weights for compatibility with more general models.
One such model is that of two independent normal samples, the standard setting
for gene expression microarray data analysis. Applying that model to proteomics data
indicates that support computed from data for a single protein can closely approximate
the estimated difference in posterior and prior odds that would be available with the
data for 20 proteins. This suggests the applicability of random-parameter models to
other situations in which the parameter distribution cannot be reliably estimated.
Keywords: empirical Bayes; indirect evidence; information for discrimination; minimum
description length; model selection; multiple comparisons; multiple testing; normalized max-
imum likelihood; strength of statistical evidence; weighted likelihood
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1 Introduction
The p-value has now served science for a century as a measure of the incompatibility between
a simple (point) null hypothesis and an observed sample of data. The celebrated advantage
of the p-value is its objectivity relative to Bayesian methods in the sense that it is based
on a model of frequencies of events in the world rather than on a model that describes the
beliefs or decisions of an ideal agent.
On the other hand, the Bayes factor has the salient advantage that it is easily interpreted
in terms of combining with previous information. Unlike the p-value, it is a measure of
support for one hypothesis over another; that is, it quantifies the degree to which the data
change the odds that the hypothesis is true, whether or not a prior odds is available in
the form of known frequencies. Although the Bayes factor does not depend on a prior
probability of hypothesis truth, it does depend on which priors are assigned to the parameter
distribution under the alternative hypothesis unless that alternative hypothesis is simple, in
which case the Bayes factor reduces to the likelihood ratio if the null hypothesis is also simple.
Unfortunately, the improper prior distributions generated by conventional algorithms cannot
be directly applied to the Bayes factor. That has been overcome to some extent by dividing
the data into training and test samples, with the training samples generating proper priors for
use with test samples, but at the expense of requiring the specification of training samples
and, when using multiple training samples, a method of averaging (Berger and Pericchi,
1996).
On the basis of concepts defined in Section 2, Section 3 will marshal results of information
theory to seize the above advantages of the p-value and Bayes factor by deriving measures
of hypothesis support of wide applicability that are objective enough for routine scientific
reporting. While such results have historically been cast in terms of minimum description
length (MDL), an idealized minimax length of a message encoding the data, they will be
presented herein without reliance on that analogy. For the present paper, it is sufficient to
observe that the proposed level of support for one hypothesis over another is the difference
3
in their MDLs and that Rissanen (1987) used a difference in previous MDLs to compare
hypotheses.
To define support in terms of the difference between posterior and prior log-odds without
relying on non-frequency probability, Section 2.2 will relate the prior probability of hypothesis
truth to the fraction of null hypotheses that are true. This framework is the two-groups
model for the analysis of gene expression data by empirical Bayes methods (Efron et al.,
2001) and later adapted to other data of high-dimensional biology such as those of genome-
wide association studies (Efron, 2010b; Yang and Bickel, 2010, and references) and to data
of medium-dimensional biology such as those of proteins and metabolites (Bickel, 2010a,b).
In such applications, each gene or other biological feature corresponds to a different random
parameter, the value of which determines whether its null hypothesis is true.
While the proposed measures of hypothesis support fall under the two-groups umbrella,
they are not empirical Bayes methods since they operate without any estimation or knowl-
edge of prior distributions. Nonetheless, the unknown prior is retained in the model as a
distribution across random parameters, including but not necessarily limited to those that
generate the observed data.
Thus, the methodology of this paper is applicable to situations in which reliable estima-
tion the unknown two-groups prior is not possible. Such situations often arise in practice. For
example, the number of random parameters for which measurements are available and that
have sufficient independence between parameters is often considered too small for reliable
estimation of the prior distribution. Qiu et al. (2005) argued that, due to correlations in ex-
pression levels between genes, this is the case with microarray data. Less controversially, few
would maintain that the prior can be reliably estimated when only one random parameter
generated data, e.g., when the expression of only a single gene has been recorded. Another
example is the setting in which the data cannot be reduced to continuous test statistics that
adequately meet the assumptions of available empirical Bayes methods of estimating the
prior distribution.
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Section 2 fixes basic notation and explains the two-groups model. Under that framework,
Section 3 defines support for one hypothesis over another in terms of a difference between
the posterior and prior log-odds. Thus, reporting support in a scientific paper enables each
reader to roughly determine what the posterior probability of either hypothesis would be
using a different hypothetical value of its unknown prior probability. Section 4 then gives
two qualifying measures of support, each of which is minimax optimal in a different sense.
In Section 5, one of the optimal measures is compared to empirical Bayes methodology using
real proteomics data. That case study addresses the extent to which optimal support on the
basis of abundance measurements of a single protein can approximate the analogous value
that would be available in the presence of measurements across multiple proteins. Finally,
Section 6 closes with a concluding summary.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Distributions given the parameter values
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the observed data vector xi of n observations is assumed to be the
outcome of Xi, the random variable of density function f (•|φi) on sample space X n for
some φi in parameter space Φ. Hypotheses about φi, called the full parameter, are stated in
terms of the subparameter θi = θ (φi), called the parameter of interest, which lies in a set
Θ. Consider the member θ0 of Θ in order to define the null hypotheses θ1 = θ0, . . . , θi = θ0,
. . . , θN = θ0. The conditional density notation reflects the randomness of the parameter to
be specified in Section 2.2.
A measurable map τ : X n → T yields ti = τ (xi) as the observed value of the ran-
dom test statistic Ti = τ (Xi). The application of the map can often reduce the data to
a lower-dimensions statistic, but the identity map may be employed if no reduction is de-
sired: Ti = Xi = τ (Xi). In some cases, the map may be chosen to eliminate the nuisance
parameter, which means the probability density function of Ti, conditional on θi, may be
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written as g (•|θi). Otherwise, the interest parameter is identified with the full parameter
(θi = θ (φi) = φi), in which case g (•|θi) = f (•|φi). Thus, the following methodology applies
even when the nuisance parameter cannot be eliminated by data reduction.
2.2 Hierarchical model
Let P1 denote the alternative-hypothesis prior distribution, assumed to have measure-theoretic
support Θ, and let pi0 denote the probability that a given null hypothesis is true. (Unless
prefaced by measure-theoretic, the term support in this paper means strength of statistical
evidence (§1) rather than what it means in measure theory.) Like most hierarchical models,
including those of empirical-Bayes and random-effects methods, this two-groups model uses
random parameters to represent real variability rather than subjective uncertainty:
Ti ∼ pi0g0 + pi1g1, (1)
where pi1 = 1 − pi0, and where g0 = g (•|θ0) and g1 =
∫
g (•|θ) dP1 (θ) are the null and
alternative density functions, respectively.
Let P denote a joint probability distribution of θ and Ti such that P1 = P (•|θ 6= θ0),
P (θ = θ0) = pi0, and P (•|θ = θi) admits g (•|θi) as the density function of Ti conditional
on θ = θi for all θi ∈ Θ. Let Ai denote the random variable indicating whether, for all i =
1, . . . , N , the ith null hypothesis is true (Ai = 0) or whether the alternative hypothesis is true
(Ai = 1). For sufficiently large N and sufficient independence between random parameters,
pi0 approximates, with high probability, the proportion of the N null hypotheses that are
true.
Bayes’s theorem then gives
P (Ai = 1|Ti = ti)
P (Ai = 0|Ti = ti) =
P (Ai = 1)
P (Ai = 0)
g1 (ti)
g0 (ti)
=
pi1
pi0
g1 (ti)
g0 (ti)
, (2)
but that cannot be used directly without knowledge of pi0 and of g1, which is unknown since
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P1 is unknown. Since the empirical Bayes strategy of estimating those priors is not always
feasible (§1), the next section presents an alternative approach for inference about whether
a particular null hypothesis is true.
3 General definition of support
One distribution will be said to surrogate the other if it can represent or take the place
of the other for inferential purposes. Before precisely defining surrogation, the reason for
introducing the concept will be explained. Given g?1, a probability density function that
surrogates g1, let P ? denote the probability distribution that satisfies both P ? (Ai = a) =
P (Ai = a) for a ∈ {0, 1} and
P ? (Ai = 1|T ?i = ti)
P ? (Ai = 0|T ?i = ti)
=
P ? (Ai = 1)
P ? (Ai = 0)
g?1 (ti)
g0 (ti)
, (3)
where T ?i has the mixture probability density function pi1g?1+pi0g0 rather than that of equation
(1). Equation (2) and P ? (Ai = 1) = P (Ai = 1) entail that P ? (Ai = 1|T ?i = ti) surrogates
P (Ai = 1|Ti = ti) inasmuch as g?1 surrogates g1, which is unknown since it depends on P1.
Thus, posterior probabilities of hypothesis truth can be surrogated by using g?1 in place of g1.
Although the surrogate posterior probability depends on the proportion P ? (Ai = 1) = pi1,
the measure of support to be derived from equation (3) does not require that pi1 be known
or even that it be estimated.
The concept of surrogation will be patterned after that of universality. Let Eθi stand for
the expectation operator defined by Eθi (•) =
∫ •dP (•|θ = θi) = ∫ •g (t|θi) dt. A probability
density function g?1 is universal for the family {g (•|θi) : θi ∈ Θ} if, for any θi ∈ Θ, the
Kullback-Leibler divergence D (g (•|θi) ‖g?1) = Eθi (log [g (Ti|θi) /g?1 (Ti)]) satisfies
lim
n→∞
D (g (•|θi) ‖g?1) /n = 0. (4)
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The terminology comes from the theory of universal source coding (Grünwald, 2007, p. 200);
g?1 is called “universal” because it is a single density function typifying all of the distributions
of the parametric family. Equation (4) may be interpreted as the requirement that the per-
observation bias in log g?1 (Ti) as a predictor of log g (Ti|θi) asymptotically vanishes. This
lemma illustrates the concept of universality with an important example:
Lemma 1. Let Π denote a probability distribution that has measure-theoretic support Θ.
The mixture density g¯ defined by g¯ (t) =
∫
g (t|θ) dΠ (θ) for all t ∈ T is universal for
{g (•|θi) : θi ∈ Θ}.
Proof. By the stated assumption about Π, there is a Θ˜ ⊂ Θ such that θi ∈ Θ˜ and
∫
g (t|θ) dΠ (θ) ≥ sup
θ˜∈Θ˜
g
(
t|θ˜
)∫
Θ˜
dΠ (θ) (5)
for all θi ∈ Θ and t ∈ T . With supθ˜∈Θ˜ g
(
t|θ˜
)
≥ g (t|θi) and g¯ (t) =
∫
g (t|θ) dΠ (θ), inequality
(5) entails that
lim
n→∞
log g¯ (t)
n
≥ lim
n→∞
log g (t|θi) + log
∫
Θ˜
dΠ (θ)
n
= lim
n→∞
log g (t|θi)
n
for all θi ∈ Θ and t ∈ T . While that yields limn→∞D (g (•|θi) ‖g¯) /n ≤ 0, the information
inequality has D (g (•|θi) ‖g¯) ≥ 0. The universality of g¯ then follows from equation (4). (This
proof generalizes a simpler argument using probability mass functions (Grünwald, 2007, p.
176).)
Universality suggests a technical definition for surrogation. With respect to the fam-
ily {g (•|θi) : θi ∈ Θ}, a probability density function g′ surrogates any probability density
function g′′ for which
lim
n→∞
Eθi (log [g
′ (Ti) /g′′ (Ti)]) /n = 0 (6)
for all θi ∈ Θ. The idea is that one distribution can represent or take the place of another
for inferential purposes if their mean per-observation difference vanishes asymptotically. The
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following lemma then says that any universal distribution can stand in the place of any other
distribution that is universal for the same family. It is a direct consequence of equations (4)
and (6).
Lemma 2. If the probability density functions g′ and g′′ are universal for {g (•|θi) : θi ∈ Θ},
then g′ surrogates g′′ with respect to {g (•|θi) : θi ∈ Θ}.
The inferential use of one density function in place of another calls for a concept of
surrogation error. The surrogation error of each probability distribution P ? based on the
probability density function g?1 in place of g1 is defined by
ε? (t) = log
P ? (Ai = 1|T ?i = t)
P ? (Ai = 0|T ?i = t)
− log P (Ai = 1|Ti = t)
P (Ai = 0|Ti = t) .
Then P ? is said to surrogate P if
lim
n→∞
Eθiε
? (Ti) /n = 0 (7)
for all i = 1, . . . , N and a ∈ {0, 1}. Equation (7) states the criterion that the per-observation
bias in log [P ? (Ai = 1|T ?i = Ti) /P ? (Ai = 0|T ?i = Ti)] as a predictor of the true posterior log
odds asymptotically vanishes. This bias is conservative:
Proposition 3. If P ? is based on a density function g?1 on T , then Eθiε? (Ti) ≤ 0 for all
θi ∈ Θ.
Proof. The following holds for all i = 1, . . . , N . By equations (2) and (3) with P ? (Ai = a) =
P (Ai = a) for a ∈ {0, 1},
Eθiε
? (Ti) = −D (g1‖g?1) ,
but D (g1‖g?1) ≥ 0 by the information inequality.
The next result connects the concepts of surrogation (asymptotic per-observation unbi-
asedness) and universality.
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Theorem 4. If P ? is based on a density function g?1 that is universal for {g (•|θi) : θi ∈ Θ},
then it surrogates P .
Proof. Since P1 has measure-theoretic support Θ, Lemma 1 implies that g1 is universal for
{g (•|θi) : θi ∈ Θ}. The universality of g1 and g?1 for {g (•|θi) : θi ∈ Θ} then entails that g?1
surrogates g1 by Lemma 2. According to equation (6), such surrogation means
lim
n→∞
Eθi (log [g
?
1 (Ti) /g1 (Ti)]) /n = 0. (8)
By equations (2) and (3) with P ? (Ai = a) = P (Ai = a) for a ∈ {0, 1},
lim
n→∞
Eθiε
? (Ti) /n = lim
n→∞
Eθi (log [g
?
1 (Ti) /g1 (Ti)]) /n,
which equation (8) says is equal to 0.
The difference in conditional and marginal log-odds,
S? (ti) = log
P ? (Ai = 1|T ? = ti)
P ? (Ai = 0|T ? = ti) − log
P ? (Ai = 1)
P ? (Ai = 0)
, (9)
is called the support that the observation ti transmits to the hypothesis that θi 6= θ0 over
the hypothesis that θi = θ0 according to P ?, which by assumption surrogates P . While the
concise terminology follows Edwards (1992), the basis on a change in log-odds is that of the
information for discrimination (Kullback, 1968). Royall (2000a), Blume (2002), and others
have used the term strength of statistical evidence as a synonym for support in the original
sense of Edwards (1992).
Proposition 5. If P ? surrogates P based on the universal density function g?1, then the
support that the observation ti transmits to the hypothesis that θi 6= θ0 over the hypothesis
that θi = θ0 according to P ? is
S? (ti) = log
g?1 (ti)
g0 (ti)
. (10)
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Proof. Substituting the solution of equation (9) for g?1 (ti) /g0 (ti) into equation (10) recovers
equation (9).
Since the support according to P ? only depends on P ? through its universal density,
S (ti; g
?
1) = log (g
?
1 (ti) /g0 (ti)) is more simply called the support that the observation ti
transmits to the hypothesis that θi 6= θ0 over the hypothesis that θi = θ0 according to g?1.
Hence, the same value of the support applies to different hypothetical values of pi0 and even
across different density functions as g1, the unknown alternative distribution of the reduced
data.
4 Optimal measures of support
Equations (2) and (3) with P ? (Ai = a) = P (Ai = a) for a ∈ {0, 1} imply that the surroga-
tion error of P ? is equal to the surrogation error of g?1 (t),
ε? (t) = log g?1 (t)− log g1 (t) ,
which depends neither on pi0 nor on any other aspect of P ? apart from g?1. Thus, the problem
of minimizing the surrogation error of P ? reduces to that of optimizing the universal density
g?1 on which P ? is based. Such optimality may be either with respect to the population
represented by g1 or with respect to the observed sample reduced to ti. The remainder
of this section formalizes each type of optimality as a minimax problem with a worst-case
member of {g (•|θi) : θi ∈ Θ} in place of the unknown mixture density g1 =
∫
g (•|θ) dP1 (θ).
4.1 Population optimality
Among all probability density functions on T , let g?1 be that which minimizes the maximum
average log loss
sup
θi∈Θ
Eθi
(
log
g (Ti|θi)
g?1 (Ti)
)
. (11)
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Since the loss at each θi is averaged over the population represented by the sampling den-
sity g1, the solution g?1 will be called the population-optimal density function relative to
{g (•|θi) : θi ∈ Θ}. That density function has the mixture density
g?1 (t) =
∫
g (t|θi) p?1 (θi) dθi
for all t ∈ T , where p?1 is the probability density function on Θ that maximizes
∫
D (g1‖g?1) p?1 (θi) dθi
(Rissanen, 2007, §5.2.1).
The prior density function p?1 thereby defined is difficult to compute at finite samples
but asymptotically approaches the Jeffreys prior (Rissanen, 2009, §2.3.2), which was origi-
nally derived for Bayesian inference from an invariance argument (Jeffreys, 1948). Whereas
P1 is an unknown distribution of parameter values that describe physical reality, p?1 is a
default prior that serves as a tool for inference for scenarios in which suitable estimates of
P1 are not available. Lemma 1 secures the universality of g?1, which in turn implies that
log [g?1 (ti) /g0 (ti)] qualifies as support by Proposition 5.
For the observation ti, g?1 (ti) may likewise be considered as a default integrated likelihood
and the support (10) as the logarithm of a default Bayes factor. Drmota and Szpankowski
(2004) reviewed asymptotic properties of the population-optimal density function and related
it to the universal density function satisfying the optimality criterion of the next subsection.
4.2 Sample optimality
Among all probability density functions on T , let g?1 be the one that minimizes the maximum
worst-case log loss
sup
θi∈Θ,t∈T
log
g (t|θi)
g?1 (t)
. (12)
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Since the regret supθi∈Θ log [g (ti|θi) /g?1 (ti)] incurred by any observed sample ti is no greater
than that of the worst-case sample, g?1 will be referred to as the sample-optimal density
function relative to {g (•|θi) : θi ∈ Θ}. As proved by Shtarkov (1987), the unique solution
to that minimax problem is
g?1 =
g
(
•; θˆi (•)
)
∫
T g
(
t; θˆi (t)
)
dt
, (13)
with the normalizing constant Z =
∫
T g
(
t; θˆi (t)
)
dt automatically acting as a penalty for
model complexity, where themaximum likelihood estimate (MLE) for any t ∈ T is denoted by
θˆi (t) = arg supθi∈Θ g (t|θi) (Rissanen, 2007; Grünwald, 2007). The probability density g?1 (ti)
is thus known as the normalized maximum likelihood (NML). Its universality (4) follows from
the convergence of
D (g1‖g?1)
n
=
Eθi
(
log
[
g (Ti|θi) /g
(
Ti; θˆi (Ti)
)])
n
+
logZ
n
to 0, which holds under the consistency of θˆi (Ti) since the growth of logZ is asymptotically
proportional to log n (Rissanen, 2007; Grünwald, 2007). Thus, Proposition 5 guarantees that
log [g?1 (ti) /g0 (ti)] measures support.
For inference about θi, the incidental statistics t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tN provide side in-
formation or “indirect evidence” (Efron, 2010a) in addition to the “direct evidence” provided
by the focus statistic ti. The problem of incorporating side information into inference has
been addressed with the weighted likelihood function L¯i (•; ti) (Hu and Zidek, 2002; Wang
and Zidek, 2005) defined by
log L¯i (θi; ti) =
N∑
j=1
wij log g (tj|θi) , (14)
for all θi ∈ Θ, where the focus weight wii is no less than any of the incidental weights wij
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(j 6= i). For notational economy and parallelism with g (ti|θi), the left-hand side expresses
dependence on the focus statistic but not on the incidental statistics.
Replacing the likelihood function in equation (12) with the weighted likelihood function,
while taking the worst-case sample of the focus statistic and holding the incidental statistics
fixed, has the unique solution
g?1i =
L¯i
(
θ¯i (•) ; •
)∫
T L¯i
(
θ¯i (t) ; t
)
dt
, (15)
where the maximum weighted likelihood estimate (MWLE) for any t ∈ T is denoted by
θ¯i (t) = arg supθ∈Θ L¯i (θ; t) (Bickel, 2010b). Accordingly, g?1i will be called the sample-optimal
density function relative to {g (•|θi) : θi ∈ Θ} and wi1, . . . , wiN . If wij = (n+ 1)−1 (N − 1)−1
for all j 6= i and wii = 1 − (n+ 1)−1, then wi1, . . . , wiN are single-observation weights in
the sense that
∑
j 6=iwij = wii/n (Bickel, 2010b). In accordance with equation (10), the
corresponding sample-optimal support is S?i (ti) = log [g?1i (ti) /g0 (ti)]. When data are only
available for one of the N populations, the NMWL using single-observation weights may be
closely approximated by considering
log L¯1 (θ1; t1) = (n+ 1)
−1 log g (t0|θ1) +
(
1− (n+ 1)−1) log g (t1|θ1) (16)
as the logarithm of the weighted likelihood, where t0 is a pseudo-observation such as the
mode of T1 under the null hypothesis (Bickel, 2010b).
The probability density g?1i (ti) is called the normalized maximum weighted likelihood
(NMWL). It applies to more general contexts than the NML: there are many commonly used
distribution families for which
∫
T L¯i
(
θ¯i (t) ; t
)
dt but not
∫
T g
(
t; θˆi (t)
)
dt is finite (Bickel,
2010b). As with other extensions of the NML to such families (Grünwald, 2007, Chapter 11),
conditions under which the NMWL is universal have yet to be established. Thus, Proposition
5 cannot be invoked at this time, and one may only conjecture that S?i (ti) satisfies the general
criterion of a measure of support (§3) in a particular context. The conjecture is suggested
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for the normal family by the finding of the next section that g?1i (ti) can closely approximate
a universal density even for very small samples.
5 Proximity to simultaneous inference: a case study
This section describes a case study on the extent to which support computed on the ba-
sis of measurements of the abundance of a single protein can approximate the true differ-
ence between posterior and prior log odds. Since that true difference is unknown, it will
be estimated using an empirical Bayes method to simultaneously incorporate the available
abundance measurements for all proteins.
Specifically, the individual sample-optimal support of each protein was compared to an
estimated Bayes factor using levels of protein abundance in plasma as measured in the
laboratory of Alex Miron at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute. The participating women
include 55 with HER2-positive breast cancer, 35 mostly with ER/PR-positive breast cancer,
and 64 without breast cancer. The abundance levels, available in Li (2009), were transformed
by shifting them to ensure positivity and by taking the logarithms of the shifted abundance
levels (Bickel, 2010a).
The transformed abundance levels of protein i were assumed to be IID normal within
each health condition and with an unknown variance σ2i common to all three conditions. For
one of the cancer conditions and for the non-cancer condition, µcanceri and µ
healthy
i will denote
the means of the respective normal distributions, and ncancer ∈ {55, 35} and nhealthy = 64 will
likewise denote the numbers of women with each condition. Let Ti represent the absolute
value of the Student t statistic appropriate for testing the null hypothesis of θi = 0, where
θi = |δi| and
δi =
µcanceri − µhealthyi
σi/ (m−1 + n−1)
−1/2 ,
the standardized cancer-healthy difference in the population mean transformed abundance
in the ith protein. Under the stated assumptions, the Student t statistic, conditional on δi,
15
Figure 1: Single-comparison, sample-optimal support (“minimax”; g?1 (ti) /g0 (ti)) as an ap-
proximation to the estimated support that could be achieved with multiple comparisons (“si-
multaneous”; g
(
ti|θˆalternative
)
/g0 (ti)). The “upper bound” is maxθ∈Θ g (ti|θ) /g0 (ti) (Bickel,
2010c), exceeding the optimal support by a constant amount.
has a noncentral t distribution with ncancer +nhealthy−2 degrees of freedom and noncentrality
parameter δi (Bickel, 2010a). Thus, because Ti is the absolute value of that statistic, θi is
the only unknown parameter of g (•|θi), the probability density function of Ti|θi.
With that model and test statistic, the NMWL and the corresponding sample-optimal
support were computed separately for each protein using ti = 0 in equation (16), as in Bickel
(2010b). For the analysis of the data of all proteins simultaneously, the same model and test
statistics were used with the two-component mixture model defined by equation (1) with
g1 = g (•|θalternative) for some unknown θalternative ∈ Θ. The true alternative density function
g1 was estimated by plugging in the maximum likelihood estimate θˆalternative obtained from
maximizing the likelihood function
N∏
i=1
(pi0g (ti|0) + (1− pi0) g (ti|θalternative))
over θalternative and pi0 (Bickel, 2010a). The results appear in Fig. 1 and are discussed in the
next section.
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6 Discussion
The proposed framework of evidential support may be viewed as an extension of likelihood-
ism, classically expressed in Edwards (1992), to nuisance parameters and multiple compar-
isons. Edwards (1992, §3.2) argued that a measure of evidence in data or support for one
simple hypothesis (sampling distribution) over another should be compatible with Bayes’s
theorem in the sense that whenever real-world parameter probabilities are available, the
support quantifies the departure of posterior odds from prior odds. The likelihood ratio
has that property, but the p-value does not since it only depends on the distribution of the
null hypothesis. As compelling as the argument is for comparing two simple hypotheses,
the pure likelihood approach does not apply to a composite hypothesis, a set of sampling
distributions.
Perceiving the essential role of composite hypotheses in many applications, Zhang (2009)
previously extended the likelihoodism by replacing the likelihood for the single distribution
that represents a simple hypothesis with the likelihood maximized over all parameter values
that constitute a composite hypothesis. Thus, the strength of evidence for the alternative
hypothesis that φ is in some interval (or union of intervals) Φ1 over the null hypothesis that
φ is in some other interval Φ0 would be maxφ∈Φ1 f (xi|φ) /maxφ∈Φ0 f (xi|φ). For example, the
strength of evidence favoring φ 6= φ0 over φ = φ0 would be maxφ∈Φ f (xi|φ) /f (xi|φ0). The
related approach of Bickel (2010c) performs the maximization after eliminating the nuisance
parameter: maxθ∈Θ g (ti|θ) /g (ti|θ0). While that approach to some extent justifies the use of
likelihood intervals (Fisher, 1973) and has intuitive support from the principle of inference to
the best explanation (Bickel, 2010c), it tends to overfit the data from a predictive viewpoint.
For example, if θ1 = arg maxθ∈Θ1 L (θ), then the evidence for the hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ1
would be just as strong as the evidence for the hypothesis that θ = θ1 even if the latter
hypothesis were in primary view before observing x. Thus, the maximum likelihood ratio is
considered as an upper bound of support in Fig. 1.
The present paper also generalizes the pure likelihood approach but without such over-
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fitting. The proposed approach grew out of the Bayes-compatibility criterion of Edwards
(1992). By leveraging recent advances in J. Rissanen’s information-theoretic approach to
model selection, the Bayes-compatibility criterion was recast in terms of predictive distribu-
tions, thereby making support applicable to composite hypotheses. To qualify as a measure of
support, a statistic must asymptotically mimic the difference between the posterior and prior
log-odds, where the parameter distributions considered are physical in the empirical Bayes
or random effects sense that they correspond to real frequencies or proportions (Robinson,
1991), whether or not the distributions can be estimated.
Generalized Bayes compatibility has advantages even when support is not used with
a hypothetical prior probability. For example, defining support in terms of the difference
between the posterior and prior log-odds (9) is sufficient for interpreting S? (ti) ≥ 5 or some
other some level of support in the same way for any sample size (Royall, 2000b). In other
words, no sample-size calibration is necessary (cf. Bickel, 2010b).
In addition to the Bayes-compatibility condition, an optimality criterion such as one of
the two lifted from information theory is needed to uniquely specify a measure of support
(§4). One of the resulting minimax-optimal measures of support performed well compared
to the upper bound when applied to measured levels of a single protein (§5). The stan-
dard of comparison was the difference between posterior and prior log odds that could be
estimated by simultaneously using the measurements of all 20 proteins. While both the
minimax support and the upper bound come close to the simultaneous-inference standard,
the conservative nature of the minimax support prevented it from overshooting the target
as much as did the upper bound (Fig. 1). The discrepancy between the minimax support
and the upper bound will become increasingly important as the dimension of the interest pa-
rameter increases. In high-dimensional applications, overfitting will render the upper bound
unusable, but minimax support will be shielded by a correspondingly high penalty factor∫
T g
(
t; θˆi (t)
)
dt in equation (13).
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